It isn’t often that events conspire to warn us of what is to come, but such was the case with in 2002. The first warning came in a series of Pulitzer Prize winning newspaper articles in June of that year. Authored by reporters John McQuaid and Mark Schleifstein, a Times-Picayune series of 15 pieces entitled “Washing Away” examined the dangers facing New Orleans and the Gulf Coast if “the big one” hit. Each article in examined an important element in the risks facing the city. Some of the topics covered by the series included the history of the Army Corps of Engineers’ efforts to flood-proof the city, Gulf Coast erosion, storm protection planning, storm insurance, building codes, hurricane modeling, evacuation considerations, and local geography. After Katrina struck, the authors used this background knowledge to write one of the first books to summarize the storm–Path of Destruction–The Devastation of New Orleans and the Coming Age of Superstorms.

Just three months after the Times articles, the second warning came in the form of Hurricane Isidore that formed in the Gulf of Mexico. The storm hit western Cuba and the Yucatan Peninsula before dropping to a strong tropical storm and making landfall on September 26 at Grand Isle Louisiana with winds of over 60 mph. Storm surges above 8 feet were recorded at Rigolets, Louisiana and Gulfport Harbor, Mississippi. Five direct deaths in the U.S. were attributed to Isidore and $330 million in property damage was reported. In New Orleans, the I-10 expressway was closed due to high waters, 15 inches of rain fell on the city overwhelming drainage pumps, but overall, the city escaped severe damage.

The storm received extensive national as well as local coverage. For example, an Orlando Sentinel article summarized the vulnerability of the city when it wrote, “With a half-million residents, few evacuation routes and a population center almost surrounded by water, New Orleans is considered the nation’s most vulnerable city to a strong hurricane.” In the same article, LSU professor Joseph Suhayda was relieved the storm was as weak as it was when he said, “a hurricane as strong as Andrew…could leave the city under water for weeks…” And newly elected Mayor Ray Nagin was sufficiently alerted by the storm, “We were pleased that the storm wasn’t as strong as it could have been, but it was a really good run through for a stronger storm.”

To its credit, the Nagin administration reacted quickly to Isidore. On September 28, just two days after landfall, the mayor met with Senators Mary Landrieu and Jim Jeffords. The group discussed infrastructure shortcomings that were exposed by the storm. A formal letter asking for additional federal funds was completed, and hand delivered to the Senator Landrieu on October 1, 2002. (See this link, Page 133.)

Prophetically, the letter listed seven areas that needed improvement:
1)Pumping Stations – the pumps at the Southern Railroad Bridge had not been completed when Isidore struck, leaving the I-10 impassable due to standing water. The letter characterized this roadway as the city’s only evacuation route.
2)Pumping Capacity Expansion – the letter urged additional funding for the Army Corps of Engineers and the Southeast Louisiana Urban Flood Control Program to increase pump capacity. Over $1 billion was needed to complete this project.
3)Pump Backup – the pumps operated by the Sewerage and Water Board needed repair and replacement and City backup generators need improvement at a cost of $39 million.
4)Emergency Communications – interagency communications equipment as well as a community alert system required improvement at a cost of almost $16 million.
5)Hospital Generators – $60 million was needed to move these generators out of their basement locations at four city hospitals.
6)Light Rail Evacuation – emergency evacuation for those without any other form of transportation. The letter estimated that as many as 100,000 people would need this service.
7)Shelter of Last Resort – approximately $30 million was needed to make Charity Hospital a refuge for those who could not evacuate before a storm but needed continuous medical care (ventilators or oxygen).

Every item in the list Mayor Nagin sent to the Senators failed miserably during Hurricane Katrina. Regarding items 1-3, It is well documented that pumping stations suffered outages early on the morning of August 29 rendering them useless. (See Congressional Report – A Failure of Initiative.) As to Item 4, the harm caused by the loss of emergency communications cannot be underestimated.(See Congressional Hearing – Hurricane Katrina: Managing Law Enforcement and Communications in a Catastrophe.) Absent this failure, many of the policing and security issues that plagued the city might not have occurred. Additionally, better communication between the city’s first responders and FEMA might have avoided much of the suffering at the Superdome and the Convention Center. 

As noted in Item 5, the placement of hospital generators below ground (or sea level) was a glaring weakness that precipitated the tragedy at Memorial Hospital. (See Five Days at Memorial.) Any emergency evacuation system for low-income citizens as requested in Item 6 would have also lessened the crisis at the Convention Center and the Superdome.(See Congressional Hearing – Hurricane Katrina: Managing the Crisis and Evacuating New Orleans.) Finally, an adequate shelter of last resort, both for those needing medical care and for the general population would have prevented needless suffering. Although the Superdome served in this capacity, the decision to shelter there and the preparation of the facility for this use was poorly planned and executed.

Whose responsibility was it to implement the changes recommended in Nagin’s letter? Why were they ignored? What lessons can we learn from these warnings? Users of this site are encouraged to use the links in KatrinaArchives.org to come to their own conclusions. But the most obviously lesson is the short-sightedness of government officials. It is estimated that Katrina caused over $150 billion in damage. The total for the improvements proposed by Mayor Nagin’s letter would have less than one percent of that total. Additionally, the damage total is measure in dollars only. Lives were lost, lives were destroyed, communities were destroyed and are gone forever. When we look back at climate change 30 years from now, will we be overwhelmed by the same regret?

Footnote:  Although the image at the top of this page appears to be a Katrina related photo, it was in fact taken on President Johnson’s trip to New Orleans on September 10, 1965. Hurricane Betsy had struck the city the day before. Levees had been overtopped and breeched. Large portions of the city were underwater as a result of the storm. Betsy spurred Congress to pass the Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project (LPVHPP) which earmarked over $85 million for levees and flood control construction. By 1982, the anticipated cost of the project had risen to over $700 million, and completion of the project was not expected until 2015. The Act placed the Army Corp of Engineers in charge of construction and design of the system while maintenance would be the responsibility of local agencies. Certainly, Betsy served as a clear warning of what could happen to metro New Orleans without an adequate hurricane protection system. Photo Credit: LBJ Presidential Library, Yoichi Okamoto.